Conditions for the Success of the Lee Administration’s Vision for Peaceful Coexistence on the Korean Peninsula

J.R. Kim | President, KCPC

1. Introduction

The 1953 Armistice Agreement has prevented renewed full-scale war on the Korean Peninsula for more than seven decades, but it has never been transformed into a permanent peace regime. Instead, the peninsula has remained characterized by military confrontation and mutual distrust. North Korea’s advancing nuclear and missile capabilities, intensifying strategic competition between the United States and China, and shifts in Russia’s foreign policy have further complicated the security environment surrounding the peninsula. Peace on the Korean Peninsula is therefore no longer an issue confined to inter-Korean relations. Stability on the peninsula has direct implications for strategic stability in Northeast Asia and for the effectiveness of the international nonproliferation regime.

Against this backdrop, peace policy on the Korean Peninsula cannot be limited to preventing war. It must combine credible military deterrence with effective tension management and the restoration of channels for dialogue and communication. At the same time, it must prevent further advances in North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities while creating a pathway toward denuclearization and a durable peace regime over the long term. Peace, however, cannot be secured through a single declaration or summit. Sustainable peace requires the cumulative and sustained reduction of tensions, confidence-building measures, the implementation and verification of agreements, and institutional mechanisms capable of preserving these gains.

From this perspective, the Lee Jae-myung administration’s vision of peaceful coexistence on the Korean Peninsula should be understood not simply as a continuation of previous approaches to North Korea, but as an effort to integrate lessons from past policy experience into a coherent peace process suited to the current security environment. Its core elements can be summarized in five areas. First, it seeks to move from the stable management of the armistice toward the institutionalization of peace. Second, it aims to transform inter-Korean relations from competition over unification into a framework for peaceful coexistence. Third, on the North Korean nuclear issue, it pursues the long-term objective of denuclearization while managing immediate nuclear risks. Fourth, it regards inter-Korean exchanges and economic cooperation not merely as outcomes of peace, but as foundations for sustaining it. Fifth, recognizing that some issues cannot be resolved through inter-Korean efforts alone, it seeks to promote the normalization of North Korea’s relations with the United States and Japan while strengthening cooperation with neighboring countries.

These principles were reflected in the E.N.D. Initiative presented at the 2025 United Nations General Assembly. The initiative envisions comprehensive dialogue centered on exchange, normalization, and denuclearization as a means of reducing hostility and confrontation on the Korean Peninsula and opening an era of “peaceful coexistence and shared growth.” The Lee Jae-myung administration has identified respect for North Korea’s political system, rejection of absorption-style unification, and the non-pursuit of hostile acts as core principles of its North Korea policy. On denuclearization, it has proposed a phased and pragmatic approach centered on the “suspension–reduction–elimination” of North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities.

The Ministry of Unification’s Fifth Basic Plan for the Development of Inter-Korean Relations (2026–2030), adopted in 2026, institutionalized this policy direction. The government identified “peaceful coexistence and shared growth on the Korean Peninsula” as its overarching vision and established three major objectives: institutionalizing peaceful coexistence between North and South Korea, laying the foundation for shared growth on the Korean Peninsula, and realizing a Korean Peninsula free from war and nuclear weapons.

The Lee Jae-myung administration’s vision for peace, however, should not be viewed as a policy wholly detached from those of previous administrations. Rather, it represents an effort to adapt the accumulated experience of the Kim Dae-jung administration’s policy of reconciliation and cooperation, the Roh Moo-hyun administration’s policy of peace and prosperity, and the Lee Myung-bak administration’s policy of mutual benefit and co-prosperity to the current security environment. The objective, therefore, should not simply be to replicate past policies, but to draw on their lessons and limitations in developing a more sustainable approach to peaceful coexistence.

Instead, it is necessary to examine why previous efforts at dialogue and cooperation did not produce lasting peace and to develop a new peace process that links the resumption of dialogue and cooperation with the implementation, verification, and institutionalization of agreements.

2. From Managing the Armistice to Institutionalizing Peace

The first task in building peace on the Korean Peninsula is to move from managing the armistice to institutionalizing peace. The 1953 Armistice Agreement halted active hostilities and established a measure of military stability, but it did not resolve the underlying political and military disputes between North and South Korea or establish a permanent peace regime. As a result, the Korean Peninsula has remained in a state of precarious stability, in which the risk of war is contained in large part through the deterrence provided by the ROK-U.S. alliance, while tensions periodically escalate in response to political and military developments.

Peace policy should not treat deterrence and dialogue as mutually exclusive. Credible deterrence is essential to preventing war, but deterrence alone cannot address the underlying sources of conflict. Institutional mechanisms for managing tensions and preventing crises are also necessary. These should include reliable communication channels between military authorities, mechanisms for preventing accidental clashes, military confidence-building measures, and the restoration and implementation of existing inter-Korean agreements.

Institutionalizing peace does not mean repeatedly issuing new declarations. Rather, it requires restoring and strengthening the institutional mechanisms for peace that have been developed over time and ensuring that they remain functional despite changes in governments and political circumstances. Through numerous summits and high-level meetings, the two Koreas have accumulated agreements aimed at reducing military tensions and promoting exchanges and cooperation. The central challenge has not been simply the absence of agreements, but the lack of sufficiently robust institutions to ensure their consistent implementation, monitoring, and verification.

Accordingly, rather than repeatedly negotiating new agreements, a new peace initiative should place greater emphasis on restoring existing arrangements and ensuring their implementation, verification, and institutionalization. The Lee Jae-myung administration’s decision to identify “the institutionalization of peaceful coexistence between North and South Korea” as a goal of the Fifth Basic Plan for the Development of Inter-Korean Relations, and to identify the restoration of communication channels, the reduction of military tensions, and confidence-building as key tasks, reflects this approach.

Yet institutions alone cannot sustain peace. For these mechanisms to function effectively, the underlying framework through which inter-Korean relations are understood must also evolve. This constitutes the second major challenge in moving from management of the armistice toward a durable peace framework.

3. From Competition for Unification to Peaceful Coexistence

The stable institutionalization of inter-Korean relations requires a shift in the basic framework through which those relations are understood. For decades, both North and South Korea have regarded unification as a national objective. Against this backdrop, the 1991 Inter-Korean Basic Agreement defined inter-Korean relations as a special relationship arising from the process of pursuing unification.

Yet a shared aspiration for unification did not guarantee peaceful relations. Despite maintaining fundamentally different political and economic systems, the two Koreas competed to shape the terms of unification, drawing on their respective political, economic, and strategic advantages. This competition reinforced the tendency on each side to view the other’s political system and intentions primarily through a security lens.

This dynamic became even more pronounced during the Kim Jong-un era, as North Korea increasingly characterized inter-Korean relations as relations between two hostile states. Under these circumstances, South Korea cannot realistically expect to stabilize inter-Korean relations or restore dialogue simply by reiterating the unification-centered framework of the past. The Lee Jae-myung administration’s principles of respecting North Korea’s political system, rejecting absorption-style unification, and refraining from hostile acts can be understood as a policy response to this changed environment.

Peaceful coexistence, however, does not necessarily mean abandoning the long-term objective of unification. Rather, under current inter-Korean conditions, it prioritizes recognizing the reality of two distinct political systems and preventing conflict arising from competition to impose a particular model of unification. Establishing peaceful coexistence would create greater political space and stability for the two Koreas to address, over the longer term, questions concerning the methods and conditions of unification.

This approach also reflects continuity with the Kim Dae-jung administration’s policy of reconciliation and cooperation. That policy similarly sought to transform inter-Korean relations through mutual recognition, dialogue, and exchanges, rather than seeking to absorb North Korea or alter its political system. The Lee Jae-myung administration’s approach can therefore be understood as a more explicit adaptation of the Sunshine Policy to the current realities and challenges of inter-Korean relations.

Unification and peaceful coexistence need not be treated as mutually exclusive objectives. By reducing conflict and building trust, the two Koreas can expand exchanges and cooperation, strengthen the institutional foundations of a peace regime, and, over time, create the conditions for discussing the future of inter-Korean relations, including questions related to unification. Peaceful coexistence should thus be understood not as an alternative to unification, but as a framework for creating a stable environment in which the future direction of inter-Korean relations can be addressed.

Changing the basic framework of inter-Korean relations alone, however, cannot secure peace on the Korean Peninsula. The security challenge posed by North Korea’s advancing nuclear and missile capabilities remains. A realistic approach to the nuclear issue must therefore proceed in parallel with efforts to establish peaceful coexistence.

4. Pursuing Denuclearization While Managing Nuclear Threats

The challenge posed by North Korea’s nuclear weapons program is one of the key factors distinguishing the current security environment from that of previous peace initiatives. Given the advanced state of North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities, an approach focused exclusively on the long-term objective of denuclearization is insufficient to address immediate security risks. At the same time, de facto acceptance of North Korea as a permanent nuclear-weapon state would raise serious concerns about stability on the Korean Peninsula and the integrity of the international nonproliferation regime.

The policy objective, therefore, should be to distinguish between the long-term goal of denuclearization and the immediate task of managing nuclear risks, while pursuing both objectives in parallel. A realistic strategy need not require complete dismantlement as a precondition for opening negotiations. Instead, it should seek, through a phased process, to secure measures that prevent further advances in North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities, reduce immediate security risks, and establish a pathway toward eventual denuclearization.

Initial measures could include halting or freezing the production of additional fissile material; preventing the transfer and proliferation of nuclear and missile technologies and weapons; constraining further development of strategic systems, including ICBMs; and establishing an effective international verification regime. In return, corresponding measures—including diplomatic normalization, calibrated sanctions relief, economic cooperation, and security assurances—could be provided incrementally in response to specific and verifiable actions by North Korea.

The E.N.D. Initiative presented by President Lee Jae-myung at the 2025 United Nations General Assembly embodies this phased approach. It envisions a pragmatic sequence beginning with the “suspension” of further advances in North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities, followed by “reduction” and, ultimately, “elimination.” The initiative seeks to integrate exchanges, diplomatic normalization, and denuclearization within a broader framework for sustained dialogue and gradual risk reduction.

This approach also draws lessons from the experience of the Six-Party Talks. The September 19 Joint Statement and the February 13 Agreement sought to establish a phased process in which North Korea’s denuclearization measures were matched by corresponding political and economic measures from the international community. Their failure to achieve sustained implementation, however, demonstrates that reciprocity alone is insufficient. Effective mechanisms for verification, compliance, and implementation are equally essential to ensure that commitments are translated into concrete and sustained actions.

Future denuclearization negotiations should therefore move beyond the binary sequencing of “denuclearization first, compensation later” or “compensation first, denuclearization later.” Instead, they should establish a framework in which specific and verifiable actions by North Korea are matched by corresponding measures from the international community on a phased basis. The process should also include mechanisms for addressing violations, noncompliance, and delays in implementation. The central objective should be to link measurable reductions in nuclear risks to concrete political and economic incentives.

Ultimately, the phased management of the nuclear issue will be effective only if it contributes to improved inter-Korean relations and the normalization of North Korea’s relations with the international community. The nuclear issue should therefore be understood not simply as an arms-control problem, but as an integral component of the broader process of establishing a durable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.

5. From Reconciliation and Cooperation to Shared Growth

A peace regime cannot be sustained by political and security institutions alone. It also requires an economic and social foundation capable of reinforcing peace over time. In this respect, economic cooperation represents another important link between the Lee Jae-myung administration’s vision for peace and the approaches pursued by previous administrations.

Although the Kim Dae-jung administration’s policy of reconciliation and cooperation, the Roh Moo-hyun administration’s policy of peace and prosperity, and the Lee Myung-bak administration’s policy of mutual benefit and co-prosperity were pursued under different circumstances, they shared a common premise: that inter-Korean exchanges and economic cooperation could help improve inter-Korean relations and provide a foundation for peace.

The Lee Jae-myung administration’s concept of “shared growth” can likewise be understood as an effort to adapt this policy tradition to the current environment.

The Fifth Basic Plan for the Development of Inter-Korean Relations identifies “establishing a foundation for shared growth on the Korean Peninsula” as a major objective. It calls for mutually beneficial inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation while also promoting preparations for a future peace economy and shared growth across the Korean Peninsula.

Shared growth is distinct from providing assistance to North Korea. Sustainable economic cooperation must generate tangible benefits and incentives for both sides rather than rely primarily on unilateral transfers or political concessions. This requires identifying areas of mutual interest—including transportation and logistics, energy, agriculture, environmental protection, health care, tourism, and industrial cooperation—and developing them incrementally in accordance with the prevailing political and security environment and applicable international constraints.

Economic cooperation can be both a product of peace and a mechanism for reinforcing it. As economic and social interaction expands, shared interests and constituencies can develop, creating greater incentives to manage disputes and avoid escalation. At the same time, past experience demonstrates that economic cooperation is difficult to sustain when it remains overly vulnerable to political and military fluctuations. Shared growth therefore requires attention not only to the economic viability of individual projects, but also to political sustainability, legal predictability, and applicable international constraints.

Ultimately, the evolution from reconciliation and cooperation to peace and prosperity, mutual benefit and shared prosperity, and finally to shared growth can be understood as a process through which inter-Korean economic cooperation moves beyond improving bilateral relations toward creating shared interests and greater interdependence. The value of shared growth lies not simply in expanding economic activity on both sides, but in creating a virtuous cycle in which peace generates economic benefits, while greater economic interdependence, in turn, creates stronger incentives for peace.

Yet such a virtuous cycle cannot be established through inter-Korean efforts alone. The broader strategic environment in Northeast Asia—including the North Korean nuclear issue, international sanctions, and U.S.-China strategic competition—directly affects the conditions under which economic cooperation can proceed. The vision of peace on the Korean Peninsula therefore necessarily extends to creating an international environment conducive to peace.

6. Fostering an International Environment and a Domestic Foundation for Peace

Peace on the Korean Peninsula cannot be secured through inter-Korean efforts alone. The strategic interests of the United States, China, Japan, and Russia intersect on the peninsula, while the North Korean nuclear issue is closely linked to the international nonproliferation regime. A sustainable peace process therefore requires a multilayered strategy that advances inter-Korean relations while also engaging neighboring countries and the broader international community.

Most importantly, the ROK-U.S. alliance and peace policy should not be viewed as competing objectives. The credible deterrence provided by the ROK-U.S. alliance serves as an essential security foundation for preventing conflict. At the same time, a stable deterrence posture can create the strategic space necessary for diplomacy and dialogue. Peace policy should therefore seek to ensure that deterrence and diplomacy reinforce rather than undermine one another.

China’s role is also important. Preventing military conflict on the Korean Peninsula and managing nuclear risks cannot be separated from the broader dynamics of U.S.-China strategic competition. South Korea should therefore maintain sufficient diplomatic space for China to play a constructive role in maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula and addressing nuclear risks. Japan and Russia also have significant interests in the North Korean nuclear issue and the broader Northeast Asian security environment. Their roles need not be excluded; rather, they can be engaged selectively where cooperation is feasible and consistent with South Korea’s interests.

The concept of “cross-recognition,” which developed during the Cold War and post-Cold War periods, may offer useful lessons. In the early 1970s, proposals emerged to reduce tensions on the Korean Peninsula through the normalization of relations among the two Koreas and the major powers surrounding the peninsula. Following the end of the Cold War, South Korea established diplomatic relations with China and Russia under the Roh Tae-woo administration’s “Northern Diplomacy.” A comprehensive form of cross-recognition, however—including the normalization of relations between North Korea and the United States and Japan—was never fully realized.

The Kim Dae-jung administration supported efforts to expand North Korea’s relations with Western countries. While diplomatic normalization could broaden North Korea’s access to the international community and expand the institutional space for dialogue, it did not lead to sustained normalization of North Korea’s relations with the United States and Japan as tensions surrounding the nuclear issue re-emerged. This experience demonstrates that diplomatic normalization can create additional channels for crisis management and negotiation, but cannot by itself guarantee peace.

Accordingly, a new peace initiative should treat the normalization of inter-Korean relations and the normalization of North Korea’s relations with the United States and Japan as mutually reinforcing processes rather than separate tracks. One possible approach would be to expand diplomatic space for North Korea to establish normal relations with the international community while pursuing separate negotiations and verification mechanisms to address specific issues, including the nuclear issue, human rights, and the abduction of foreign nationals.

An enabling international environment, however, is not sufficient to ensure the continuity of peace policy. If the fundamental direction of North Korea policy changes substantially with every change of government, trust painstakingly built between the two Koreas can quickly erode. Similarly, a long-term peace process is difficult to maintain when international and inter-Korean agreements are readily revised in response to shifts in domestic politics.

A durable peace process therefore requires a domestic political and social foundation alongside international cooperation. Political parties, civil society, academia, and other stakeholders should engage in sustained discussion of the basic principles and long-term objectives of North Korea policy and seek to establish a minimum level of national consensus. This does not require consensus on every specific policy adopted by a particular administration in Washington, Seoul, or elsewhere. Rather, it requires establishing a durable framework for national policy toward peace on the Korean Peninsula that can withstand changes in government and shifting political circumstances.

7. Conclusion

The Lee Jae-myung administration’s vision for peace on the Korean Peninsula should be understood not as an entirely new policy, but as an effort to adapt the accumulated experience of previous administrations to a substantially changed security environment. Although the Kim Dae-jung administration’s policy of reconciliation and cooperation, the Roh Moo-hyun administration’s policy of peace and prosperity, and the Lee Myung-bak administration’s policy of mutual benefit and co-prosperity were pursued under different circumstances, they shared a common commitment to reducing tensions through dialogue, exchanges, economic cooperation, and the pursuit of a peace regime. The Lee Jae-myung administration’s vision builds on this policy legacy while addressing a more challenging environment shaped by North Korea’s advancing nuclear and missile capabilities and intensifying U.S.-China strategic competition.

The main challenge is not to select a single policy instrument, but to integrate multiple instruments into a coherent and sustainable strategy. Military deterrence must provide the security foundation for preventing war, while dialogue and confidence-building measures can reduce tensions and create space for diplomacy. On the nuclear issue, a phased approach is needed to constrain further advances while establishing a pathway toward long-term denuclearization. Inter-Korean exchanges and shared growth can broaden the economic and social foundations of peace, while the normalization of North Korea’s relations with the United States and Japan, together with cooperation among neighboring countries, can expand the diplomatic space needed to sustain the peace process.

Ultimately, the central task is to connect these policy instruments within a single, mutually reinforcing peace process. Peaceful coexistence provides the political basis for transforming the basic framework of inter-Korean relations, while phased management of nuclear threats provides an initial mechanism for reducing immediate security risks. Exchanges and shared growth can strengthen the economic and social foundations of peace, while diplomatic normalization can broaden the international space in which the peace process can advance. The institutionalization of peace, in turn, can help ensure that these gains endure through changes in government and shifting political circumstances.

Peaceful coexistence does not necessarily require abandoning the long-term objective of unification. Rather, under current inter-Korean conditions, it offers a pragmatic framework for preventing conflict and establishing stable relations. Denuclearization should not be viewed as a separate objective disconnected from the peace regime; rather, it is a central component of sustainable peace on the Korean Peninsula. Similarly, shared growth should not be viewed merely as a byproduct of peace, but as an economic foundation for sustaining it.

For these policies to endure, however, one additional condition is essential: domestic political consensus. Peace policy on the Korean Peninsula is unlikely to produce results in the short term. Building trust between North and South Korea, implementing agreements, and developing sustained international cooperation require time. If the fundamental direction of North Korea policy changes substantially with each change of government, it becomes difficult to establish credibility with North Korea or maintain consistency in long-term policy.

What South Korean society needs to establish, therefore, is not consensus on every specific North Korea policy pursued by an individual administration. Rather, it needs durable agreement on the basic principles of responding firmly to North Korean provocations while managing tensions through dialogue and exchanges and gradually creating the conditions for peaceful coexistence. Political parties, civil society, academia, and other stakeholders should have sustained opportunities to debate and build agreement around these principles. Such an approach would help reduce the structural volatility of North Korea policy associated with changes in government and domestic political conflict.

Ultimately, peace on the Korean Peninsula is not a goal that any single administration can achieve on its own. It is a long-term national undertaking that requires integrating security and diplomacy, denuclearization and exchanges, inter-Korean relations and international cooperation within a coherent policy framework, while building the domestic consensus necessary to sustain that approach over time. What is required for durable peace, therefore, is not simply another peace initiative, but a broad societal consensus capable of carrying that initiative beyond changes in government and periods of political conflict.